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 Abstract 
Over the past few decades, international courts and tribunals have once more risen to 
prominence: their number has grown and their case-load increased significantly, to the 
point where we are said to live in an ‘era of adjudication’. At the same time, the 
functions and mandates of courts have changed. Whilst 19th and early 20th century 
thinkers thought of them as guardians of world peace, contemporary designs of world 
order seek to ensure peace through varied forms of international organisation. 
International courts play important roles, but are no longer expected to prevent war 
and military conflict. In charting this evolution, this Research Paper offers a panorama 
on two centuries of debate on international arbitration and adjudication. 
Keywords  
International courts - international law - collective security - legalisation of international 
relations - dispute settlement - arbitration 
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World Courts as Guardians of Peace? * 
 
Christian J. Tams 
 
I. Introduction 
'If all disputes could be resolved in the hushed calm of courtrooms rather than 
the swirling world of political cut-and-thrust, then civilization could be said to have 
taken a giant and noble forward stride’ (Neff 2014: 346) – Stephen Neff’s 
statement gives eloquent expression to a recurring theme of internationalist 
thought: the hope that in a just and civilized world order, conflicts will be resolved 
not only on the basis of law, but also before institutions tasked to apply rules of 
law, viz. impartial and independent international courts and tribunals. It juxtaposes 
the dangerous world of power politics (‘swirling’, and dominated by the ‘cut-and-
thrust’) to the rational and civilized atmosphere (the ‘hushed calm’) of the 
courtroom. It evokes an image of wise arbiters of peace addressing the great 
challenges of mankind on the basis of international law and justice.  
In line with this powerful image, international courts have long been viewed as 
instruments of war-prevention. In that light ‘going to court’ is seen as an 
alternative – and no doubt a preferable one – to ‘going to war’. In fact, arbitration 
and adjudication (or at least some rudimentary form of decision-making by an 
independent body) as a means of ‘taming’ inter-state relations were there from the 
beginning of the modern debates about international peace and security. Dispute 
settlement by an impartial body of sovereigns was a crucial means of containing 
conflict and avoiding war in the peace projects of William Penn (1693: Ch. I) and the 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1713). In his Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace, Jeremy 
Bentham (1843: 552) justified his proposal for a Common Court of Judicature in the 
following terms: ‘Establish a common tribunal, the necessity of war no longer 
follows from difference of opinion. Just or unjust, the decision of the arbiters will 
save the credit, the honour, of the contending party.’ And around 150 years later, 
when an international court had become a reality, a delegate at the San Francisco 
Conference establishing the United Nations praised the establishment of the 
                                                          
 * Research towards this paper was completed during the author’s stay at the Centre for Global 
Cooperation Research (2015/16); the Centre’s support is gratefully acknowledged. The author 
also wishes to thank Athene Richford and Joanna Wilson (both at Glasgow) for valuable 
assistance.  
This paper draws on, and adapts, material used for the author’s earlier study on the role of 
world courts in Catholic peace ethics: see C.J. Tams, ‘World Peace through International 
Adjudication?’ in H.G. Justenhoven and M.E. O’Connell (eds.), Peace Through Law: Can 
Humanity Overcome War? (Nomos/Hart 2016).. 
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International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a way of ‘substituting orderly processes for 
the vicissitudes of war and the reign of brutal force’ (UNCIO 1945: 393). 
 
A further seventy years on, the landscape of international adjudication has 
changed beyond recognition. International courts and tribunals – non-existent at 
the times of Penn, Saint-Pierre and Bentham; a rarity in 1945 – have mushroomed. 
A recent account puts the number of operative permanent international courts at 
‘at least two dozen’, and the number of binding judicial decisions rendered 
between 1990 and 2011 at a staggering 34,000 (Alter 2014a: 53, 65 and 68).1 
International lawyers have begun to speak of the present era as an ‘age of 
adjudication’, noting that recourse to courts and tribunals has become more 
common than ever before in the history of international relations.2 And not just the 
numbers have changed. The change is qualitative as much as it is quantitative; it 
affects the functions of international adjudication as well. Courts today are not just 
dispute settlers, they are also law-makers, fact-finders, and instruments of 
governance.3 But do they play a significant role in preserving world peace? Does 
Bentham’s straightforward argument – ‘[e]stablish a common tribunal, the 
necessity of war no longer follows from difference of opinion’ (Bentham 1843: 552) 
– still have any purchase? Perhaps less than the term ‘age of adjudication’ might 
suggest. 
 
*** 
 
These cursory remarks point to important changes in the role of international 
courts in international relations, and in our expectations of their influence on 
international affairs. The subsequent considerations explore these changes by 
tracing the history of international arbitration and adjudication over the past two 
centuries.4 To trace developments, the discussion follows a chronological approach, 
                                                          
 1 The numbers do not include non-permanent bodies engaged in dispute settlement, such as 
investment tribunals.  
 2 The title of a lecture by Judge Christopher Greenwood, at http://legal.un.org/avl/ls/ 
Greenwood_CT.html.  
 3 The debate about the functions of international courts is still at an early stage. The 
terminology used in the text follows Alvarez 2014: 159. For influential accounts (often using 
other terminology) see e.g. Alter 2014a: 63; and Kingsbury, in Crawford and Koskenniemi 
2012: 203. 
 4 The subsequent discussion does not systematically distinguish between the two main modes 
of binding dispute resolution, viz. adjudication before standing courts and arbitration (where 
the parties enjoy greater influence over the dispute settlement process, including by 
choosing the arbitrators). As is clear from section II.1., historically, arbitration precedes 
adjudication; and for a while (as noted in III.1.), the establishment of a standing international 
court was an important demand. However, since 1945, there has been a rapprochement; and 
from the perspective of dispute settlers, arbitral and adjudicative bodies are essentially 
characterized by their power to render binding decisions. For more on this see Brownlie 2009: 
267, 273–7. For more on the early history of arbitration see Ralston 1929; Fraser 1926: 179; 
Lingens 1988. Instructive summaries can be found in O’Connell and VanderZee 2014: 42; 
Roelofsen 2014: 145. 
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within which a number of broad general developments concerning international 
courts are considered. For reasons of convenience, the narrative distinguishes four 
stages in the on-going debate about the role of world courts: the gradual re-
emergence of arbitration as a common method of dispute settlement from the end 
of the 18th century (section II.); the consolidation of this practice, coupled with 
efforts to make it compulsory, from the late 19th century onwards in what might 
be described as an idealistic turn in dispute resolution (section III.); the pragmatic 
turn from the inter-War period, which envisioned a much more circumscribed role 
for international courts and which continues to dominate debates (section IV.); and 
the more recent revitalization, characterized by the establishment of dozens of new 
courts and tribunals, but firmly wedded to the pragmatist understanding of their 
role (section V.). Needless to say, the distinction between four stages of 
development does not do justice to the continuous evolution of ideas: debates 
about world courts have been far too diverse to be neatly categorized into four 
‘eras’, and the treatment in the following is impressionistic rather than 
comprehensive. Yet it is hoped that by following a simplified structure, the 
subsequent discussion will succeed in accentuating important developments in the 
international community’s perception of courts and tribunals as instruments of 
world peace.  
II. New Beginnings: the Gradual Re-emergence of 
International Arbitration 
Where there is law, there are disputes. International law forms no exception: 
much of it has been forged in disputes about legal rights and duties. Yet 
international law is special in that, compared to other legal systems, courts and 
tribunals have historically played a relatively limited role in the process of settling 
international legal disputes. To be sure, from ancient times the actors of 
international law have occasionally relied on impartial third parties for the 
settlement of their disputes; arbitration did indeed take place (in the words of an 
influential treatise published in the 1920s) ‘from Athens to Locarno’ (and has, since 
then, continued; Ralston 1929).5 But submission to binding dispute settlement was 
always based on the consent of the parties; at no point in time were states legally 
required to accept adjudication or arbitration as a regular means of dispute 
settlement. What is more, during the formative age of contemporary international 
law – the 17th and 18th centuries – binding dispute resolution was very much in 
decline:6 A system emphasizing external sovereignty approached the notion of an 
impartial authority sitting in judgment over independent states with some caution. 
                                                          
 5 See also O’Connell and VanderZee 2014: 42: ‘Formal processes of inter-group dispute 
resolution long pre-date the rise of modern international law in 1648’. 
 6 Fraser (1926: 196) speaks of an 'eclipse’, Grewe (2000: 363) of a ‘nadir of international 
arbitration’, but that may be an exaggeration: contrast the accounts of Roelofsen 2014: 155–
9, and (in greater detail) Lingens 1988. In Roelofsen’s (159) words: ‘In the 18th century, the 
idea of arbitration enjoyed a certain popularity but its actual practice was in decline. Even 
though there was no total eclipse of arbitration in diplomatic practice, the number of actual 
cases of arbitration from the 1730s on recorded in treaty practice is small’.  
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The cautious approach was overcome in the course of the late 18th and 19th 
centuries during which international arbitration re-emerged as a useful means of 
dispute resolution.7  
Arbitration as a useful form of dispute settlement 
While drawing on ancient practices, ‘[p]our voir surgir de manière définitive et 
précise les moyens de [règlement pacifique des différends] interétatiques tels 
qu’on les connaît aujourd’hui, il a fallu attendre l’émergence et la consolidation de 
l’Etat moderne et d’une société interétatique.’ (Caflisch 2001: 306). The Jay Treaty 
of 17948 is widely credited9 with having ushered in the new era: concluded between 
two recent belligerents, Great Britain and the United States of America, it 
envisaged different arbitral mechanisms to address boundary disputes, claims by 
British merchants against U.S. nationals, and claims by U.S. citizens against Great 
Britain. These mechanisms and their frequent use10 did much to help regularize the 
practice of arbitration, which in the course of the 19th century came to be seen as a 
useful, practical way of settling disputes – and acceptable even to states protesting 
their sovereignty, as it was not imposed, but remained based on their consent. In 
retrospect, the breadth of disputes considered arbitrable is quite remarkable: large 
numbers of inter-state treaties provided for arbitration over boundary disputes, 
many others set up institutions to deal with pecuniary claims (whether inter-state 
or claims by private citizens).  
Regularization and adaptation 
For all that, arbitration remained an unusual form of dispute resolution. Stuyt’s 
prominent survey (1990) lists circa 180 awards rendered in the century following 
the Jay Treaty, i.e. less than two per year. But it clearly became less uncommon; 
especially if the more numerous (yet typically smaller) claims addressed by claims 
commissions are taken into account (see Dolzer 2011: para. 6–7). And over time, 
                                                          
 7 The process has been described in detail elsewhere. For reliable accounts see e.g. Simpson 
and Fox 1959: ch. 1; Caflisch 2001: 245. 
 8 Reproduced in Hunter Miller 1931 and in Tams and Tzanakopoulos 2012: 3.  
 9 Ralston (1929: 191) is emphatic: ‘the modern era of arbitral or judicial settlement of 
international disputes, by common accord among all writers upon the subject, dates from the 
signing on 19 November 1794 of Jay’s Treaty between Great Britain and the United States’. 
But this claim – just like Fraser’s point about the ‘eclipse’ of arbitration in the early modern 
era (1926) – is in fact quite controversial: deviating from the alleged ‘common accord’, Lingens 
(1988: 153) and Roelofsen (2014: 160) emphasize commonalities between the Jay Treaty 
arbitration and earlier 18th century precedents. That said, the Jay Treaty was special because 
it marked the conscious use of arbitration to address claims (including those by private 
individuals) relating to a prior major conflict, and because it resulted in a large number of 
decisions.   
 10 A point stressed by O’Connell and VanderZee (2014: 44), who note that ‘[b]etween 1794 and 
1804, 536 arbitral awards were made under the Jay Treaty, beginning with the St. Croix River 
Arbitration of 1798, which delineated much of the Canada–United States boundary’. 
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the process of binding dispute settlement matured and evolved.11 Sovereign 
arbitration by heads of states or dignitaries – Kings, Queens, Tsars, Emperors, and 
on occasion even the Senate of Hamburg12 – was gradually replaced by 
professionalized forms of arbitration, with lawyers taking (and not just preparing) 
decisions. Unreasoned decisions gave way to reasoned awards. Parties and 
arbitrators took greater pains to clarify the basis of decisions; decisions came to be 
rendered on the basis of some pre-identified body of law (as opposed to equity), 
and in turn contributed to the thickening of rules governing international claims. 
And finally, best practices of arbitral procedure (how to select arbitrators; how to 
deal with evidence, etc.) began to crystallize.   
The experience with the Alabama claims of 1872,13 another landmark, suggested 
that, in fact, sovereign states (including the powerful ones) would accept the 
authority of international law even where this came at a considerable price: 
grudgingly, no doubt, but relatively swiftly, the United Kingdom paid $ 15.5 million 
to the United States, to compensate for damages caused by Confederate ships 
which the United Kingdom had failed to prevent. This sent a powerful signal, and 
one not lost on states: henceforth, there were calls to rely on arbitration not only 
as a form of ‘emergency treatment’, resorted to once a dispute had arisen, but 
prospectively, by formulating arbitration treaties that would allow resort to 
arbitration in future disputes (Caflisch 2001: 307).14 Arbitration had come of age.15 
                                                          
 11 The point is overlooked in quite a number of general accounts. See Simpson and Fox (1959: 1–
12) for a clear summary. 
 12 See e.g. the two British-Portuguese disputes (1855, 1861) about indemnities and denial of 
justice, referred to in Stuyt 1990. 
 13 For the relevant documents see Parry 1969: 145; Tams and Tzanakopoulos 2012: 5; and 
Lapradelle and Politis 1923: 889. In the words of two commentators, ‘[t]his award—and, 
indeed, the arbitral process itself—energized the peace movement and motivated states to 
engage in arbitration to settle more disputes. The single most important fact about the 
Alabama Claims was the example of a great power voluntarily entering into arbitration with a 
weaker state over an important issue and abiding by the result’ (O’Connell and VanderZee 
2014: 45). See further Caron 2000: 4, 8–9; and, for many details, Bingham 2005: 1.  
 14  See further below, III.1. 
 15 A (fictitious) scene from August Strindberg’s The German Lieutenant (which David Caron refers 
(2000: 9) to in his account) illustrates the importance attached to the Alabama arbitration at 
the time. It involves the German Lieutenant von Bleichroden and his wife discussing politics 
with other guests in a hotel in Vevey on the Lake Geneva. While they converse, ‘the dark, 
steel-blue evening sky was cut through by a streak of light, and above the low-lying Savoy 
shore there rose a rocket of enormous size ... before it exploded with a report which took two 
minutes to reach Vevey. Then there spread out something like a white cloud which assumed a 
four-cornered rectangular shape, a flag of white fire; a moment after there was another 
report, and on the white flag appeared a red cross. All the party sprang up and hastened into 
the veranda. “What does that mean?” exclaimed Herr von Bleichroden, startled. No one could 
or would answer, for now there rose a whole volley of rockets as if discharged from a crater 
over the peaks of the Voirons, and scattered a shower of fire which was reflected in the 
gigantic mirror of the lake. “Ladies and gentlemen!” said the Englishman, raising his voice, 
while a waiter placed a tray with filled champagne glasses on the table. “Ladies and 
gentlemen!”, he repeated, “this means, according to the telegram which I have just received, 
that the first International Tribunal at Geneva has finished its work; this means that a war 
between two nations, or what would have been worse—a war against the future, has been 
prevented … The Alabama Question has been settled not to the advantage of America, but of 
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III. Building the ‘Invisible Palace of Law and Justice’16: the 
Idealist Turn in Dispute Settlement  
Since its re-emergence during the 19th century, binding dispute settlement has 
remained part of international relations. However, its relevance has varied over 
time. The subsequent sections highlight the main ‘ups’ and ‘downs’, and they begin 
on a wildly optimistic note: towards the end of the 19th century, the ideas of 
arbitration and adjudication gained huge momentum. To a powerful ‘legalist 
movement’,17 courts and tribunals were the obvious instruments of world peace, 
and arbitration and adjudication natural ways of resolving international conflicts in 
a civilized world society, which – having opted for binding dispute resolution – 
would no longer need to espouse war.  
The legalist movement 
Developments during the two to three decades preceding World War 1 are little 
short of remarkable.18 They witnessed unprecedented popular debates about – 
perhaps even obsession with – dispute settlement, arbitration and adjudication. 
Prior to the emergence of general world organizations, courts and tribunals were 
seen as central elements of a better world order. This was an ‘idealist turn’ of 
significance. Until the outbreak of World War 1, idealist sentiment dominated the 
day and led to significant advances in the cause of peaceful dispute resolution. And 
four years after the end of the war, the international community would eventually 
set up its first ‘world court’, the Permanent Court of International Justice, in The 
Hague. Yet by then, faith in international courts and tribunals as guardians of world 
peace had been shaken, many progressive internationalists began to embrace 
other projects, and the legalist movement for international arbitration and 
adjudication had begun to lose steam. 
Yet what power the legalist movement possessed at the turn of the last century! 
In retrospect, one cannot but be amazed at the huge appeal of the concepts, which, 
                                                                                                                                                              
justice, not to the injury of England, but for the good of future generations. Does our Spanish 
friend still believe that wars are unavoidable? When our French friend smiles again, let him 
smile with the heart and not with the lips only. To-day, as an Englishman, I ought to feel 
depressed, but I feel proud on account of my country, as an Englishman always does, you 
know; but to-day I have a right to be so, for England is the first European Power which has 
appealed to the verdict of honourable men, instead of to blood and iron. And I wish you all 
many such defeats as we have had to-day, for that will teach us to be victorious. Raise your 
glasses, ladies and gentlemen, for the Red Cross, for in this sign we will certainly conquer.”’ 
(Strindberg 1915: 64–5). 
 16 Schücking  1918: xi. 
 17 Terminology is not uniform. Others speak of the ‘international arbitration campaign’ or 
‘movement’ (see e.g. Mazower 2013: 83), but that risks ignoring the push for international 
adjudication and ‘proper courts’.  
 18 For much more on the 'legalist movement’ see the highly accessible accounts by Mazower 
2013: 81 et seq.; and Hollander 2013: chapter 1 (‘A Prelude for Peace); and further, Reid 2004: 
527. The American approach – by far the most influential – was shaped by the work of Ladd 
1840; it is covered in detail in Boyle 1999; M.E. O’Connell 2009: 30; and Janis 2004: 95 et seq. 
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barely a century earlier, had had to be rescued from near-obsolescence. 
Predictably, the emerging influential professional networks of international 
lawyers – the Institut de droit international and the International Law Association, 
both set up in 187319 – found the idea of orderly dispute resolution according to 
legal standards attractive and supported it. But beyond that, and much less 
predictably, from the late 19th century ‘international arbitration’ and, increasingly, 
‘international adjudication’ became rallying cries for a wide range of 
heterogeneous pressure groups, among them pacifists, the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union, socialist movements, national leagues for the furtherance of peace, and 
religious associations including the Catholic Church.20 These, and many more, 
formed a powerful legalist movement: no doubt a broad church, but firm in its faith 
in courts and tribunals as guardians of world peace and committed (more 
pragmatically) to increase their role in world affairs. This, to be sure, was but one of 
a number of progressive causes of the day; but around the turn of the last century, 
it was at the forefront of the internationalist struggle.21  
In the two decades preceding the outbreak of the First World War, the legalist 
movement seemed to go from strength to strength. Its manifestos exuded growing 
confidence.22 Its claims were espoused by universal peace congresses. And 
advocates of international courts and tribunals – such as Asser, Fried, Root, Cramer, 
the Institut de droit international, and Theodor Roosevelt – dominated the lists of 
Nobel Peace laureates.23 By 1914, as noted by Mark Mazower, ‘the campaign for 
international arbitration’ was ‘probably the single most influential strand of 
internationalism’.24 Alongside civil society groups, it included relevant political 
                                                          
 19 On both, and on the emergence of an international legal profession from the 19th century, 
see Koskenniemi 2002: 11 et seq. 
 20 Janis (2004: 95) underlines the limited influence of trained (international) lawyers: given how 
much debate about today’s international courts has become ‘the erudite province of lawyers 
and judges’, he notes that ‘it is easy to suppose that it was a juridical impulse that was 
principally responsible for their creation. However, to a surprising extent, the international 
courts of today were the work of nineteenth-century American Utopians by and large 
untrained in law’.  
 21 As Caron (2000) observes, ‘these [pacifist] movements could have chosen other strategies to 
promote peace’ (and in fact they would during most of the 20th century); because this is so, 
‘[the internationalists’ focus on a permanent international court deserves attention’ (8). Reid 
(2004) agrees that the focus on courts and tribunals was ‘deliberate and methodical’ (543). 
The fact that the Inter-Parliamentary Union had initially been founded as an 'Inter-
Parliamentary Conference on International Arbitration’ reflects the prominence of 
international arbitration to the internationalist cause. 
 22 'The feasibility of arbitration as a substitute for war is now demonstrated’ – this was the 
opening line of the 1895 Resolution adopted at the first Lake Mohonk Conference on 
International Arbitration. John Westlake’s treatise on International Law (vol. 1, 1896: 368) 
ended with the words: ‘[I]nternational arbitration is in the air. … It is the season to raise our 
hopes, and do our utmost to try what the idea of international arbitration can accomplish’.   
23  See http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/ for details, short biographies, 
and acceptance speeches. 
24  Mazower 2013: 83; see also Reid 2004: 528: ‘On the global level, turn-of-the-century peace 
advocates were unique because of their composition and their political foresight. Current and 
former members of American, British, French, Japanese, Chinese, and Italian governments 
eventually participated in these gatherings of arbitrationists, as did military personnel, clergy, 
labor, teachers, bankers, and journalists’. Janis (2004: 145) notes that ‘by the turn of the 
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establishment figures (notably within the United States), and while it faced 
divisions between the more utopian and more pragmatic camps, agreement on 
core demands remained strong: more binding dispute resolution would minimize 
tensions between states; as a consequence, it was necessary to increase the reach 
of treaties requiring states to accept arbitration and adjudication, and ideally to 
move from ad hoc arrangements to standing international courts.  
Disappointments and incremental progress 
Needless to say, the practical implementation of these proposals proved 
challenging. Yet, despite disappointments, vigorous lobbying by the legalist 
movement facilitated the consolidation and significant expansion of binding 
dispute settlement in the period up to 1914. The Hague Peace Conferences – 
convened by Tsar Nicolas as an inter-state congress,25 but shaped, at least to some 
extent, by ‘world society action’ (Clark 2007: 71) – saw states discuss proposals for 
compulsory dispute settlement. In the end, as is well known, the Conferences did 
not endorse proposals requiring states to accept arbitration as obligatory, but they 
reflected the broad support for the principle.26 The 1899 Hague Convention for the 
Pacific Settlement of Disputes set up a mechanism for the smooth organization of 
arbitral proceedings (which it misleadingly called the ‘Permanent Court of 
Arbitration’ (PCA)27) and, recognized that ‘[i]n questions of a legal nature ... 
arbitration is ... the most effective, and, at the same time, the most equitable 
means of settling disputes which diplomacy has failed to settle’.28 Eight years later, 
at the second Hague Conference, a clear majority of states were willing to accept 
compulsory arbitration in all disputes not involving questions of vital interests, and 
only after ‘titanic debate’ (Eyffinger 2007: 219) did a handful of states succeed in 
blocking the adoption of a provision to this effect (Tams 2007: 126–7).29  
At the bilateral and regional level, like-minded states went further. While the 
time may not have been ripe for a universal arbitration treaty, states concluded 
dozens of bilateral arbitration treaties that permitted the unilateral recourse to 
arbitration in the event of a dispute.30 The Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
misnamed though it may have been, allowed for arbitral proceedings to be initiated 
relatively smoothly; and its record of its activities at the beginning of the 20th 
                                                                                                                                                              
century, British and US international law enthusiasts were exerting increasing influence over 
their governments’.  
25  Cf. the Russian Circular Note of December 1898, reproduced in Scott 1920: xv. 
26  On the conferences (and their impact on dispute settlement) see e.g. Baker 2009. For more 
on the first conference see Caron 2000; for details on the second see Eyffinger 2007: 197; and 
Tams 2007: 119. 
 27  As has often been observed, the PCA was neither a ‘court’ nor ‘permanent’. To which one may 
add that since the 1930s, it has no longer 'arbitrated', but has administered arbitrations 
organized outside the Hague Convention.   
 28 Convention (I) on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1899), Article 20. 
 29 Two other courts proposed at The Hague never saw the light of day: the Court of Arbitral 
Justice and the International Prize Court. For details see Tams 2007: 127–9.  
 30 The United States entered into 22 such treaties during 1908 and 1909 (though with caveats 
for disputes involving vital interests): see Neff 2014: 329–30. 
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century reflects a growing willingness of states to submit to binding dispute 
resolution.31 And where the Hague Peace Conference had been deadlocked over 
the establishment of permanent institutions, American states in 1907 set up the 
first proper international court, the Central American Court of Justice, competent 
to hear inter-state disputes as well as claims by private citizens.32 An influential US 
Handbook of International Law published in 1910 gave expression to a widespread 
sentiment when noting that ‘in a single decade the advance made in centuries [had 
been] surpassed’ (Wilson 1910: v).33 In the light of these developments, the 
inauguration of the Peace Palace in The Hague, on 28 August 1913, was perceived 
by many as another ‘coming of age’: built with American funds by European leaders, 
it reflected the consolidation of the arbitration movement and symbolized the 
power of the legalist movement. 
 Confidence undermined: sleepwalking into war 
Then came 28 June 1914, which exposed the hollowness of the structure. The 
July crisis in particular highlighted the limited practical impact of international 
arbitration treaties. Nations (including those who had come out in favour of 
compulsory dispute settlement) consciously shunned ‘the hushed calm of court 
rooms’ and instead opted for the ‘swirling world of political cut-and-thrust’ (cf. Neff 
2014).34 Over the following four years of bitter warfare, they would come to rely on 
attrition tactics, unrestricted submarine warfare, chemical weapons, and genocidal 
violence. Arbitration, which prior to 1914 had helped resolve low- and mid-level 
conflicts, proved powerless to stop a major global conflict from spiralling out of 
control. 
This was not lost on statesmen and observers, and it led to an (under-
appreciated35) re-assessment of the role of international courts and tribunals. 
When, driven by war fatigue and the growing awareness of the horrors of war, the 
leaders of the Allied and Associated Powers began to design the post-war world 
order, international courts and tribunals no longer took centre stage in their 
visions. True, the inter-war period saw the creation of the first ever world court, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. But even the grand rhetoric 
commemorating its inauguration36 could not mask the fact that this was to be a 
                                                          
 31 For a detailed survey see François 1955 : 479–522. 
 32 See American Journal of International Law 1908 (vol. 2, suppl. 231 for the founding 
document, and further Riquelme Cortado 2013. 
 33 For more on the pre-1914 sentiment see Hollander 2012: 7–13. 
 34 As Matheson notes, ‘on the brink of the War in July 1914, the Tsar proposed to the Kaiser that 
the dispute between Austria and Serbia about the assassination of Archduke [Franz] 
Ferdinand be submitted for arbitration in The Hague, but Austria was unwilling’ (Matheson 
2013: 19). 
 35 The following draws on Wertheim 2012: 210. For much more on ‘legalist’ and ‘anti-legalist’ 
trends in the establishment of the post-WW1 order see Kennedy 1987: 841; condensed 
accounts can be found in Mazower 2013: 119–23; and Bernstorff 2010: 193–5). 
 36 See e.g. Scott 1921: 55: ‘We should ... fall upon our knees and thank God that the hope of ages 
is in process of realization’. At the inaugural ceremony, the League of Nations Secretary 
General, Sir Eric Drummond, had even gone so far as to praise the Court’s establishment as 
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different court from the supreme tribunal envisaged by the legalists. Unlike in 
1907, when proposals to make arbitration compulsory had enjoyed the support of 
Britain, France and the United States (to name but a few), this time the great 
powers ensured the world court would not possess automatic jurisdiction.37 In 
practice, as will be explored in the next section, it was to be a court for low- and 
mid-level disputes (see infra: IV.1). And most importantly, the world court was 
designed to operate on the margins of the new world organization, the League of 
Nations: not part of the League’s machinery for preserving peace and barely 
integrated in its (ill-fated) collective security system. The League’s founders were 
idealist, too, but theirs was not the idealism of the legalists. Their idealism did not 
centre on arbitration or adjudication but on collective decision-making within 
international organizations: not the force of law but the strength of political action 
backed by public opinion were to ensure the League’s success.38 Elihu Root’s 
assessment of the League Covenant reflected a sense of disappointment at the 
‘relegation’ of legalist thought in new post-war order: ‘Nothing has been done to 
provide for the reestablishment and strengthening of a system of arbitration or 
judicial decision ... We are left with a program which rests the hope of the whole 
world for future peace in a government of men, and not of laws, following the 
dictates of expediency, and not of right’.39 And so, the post-war order brought 
about the long-sought establishment of a proper world court, but at the same time 
saw that court relegated to the margins of the newly established architecture of 
international security.40 The idealist approach of the early 20th century was giving 
                                                                                                                                                              
‘the greatest and ... most important creative act of the League … There have been various 
well-distinguished marks in the progress of mankind. The opening of the Court is not the least 
of these. Indeed, we believe and hope that it will prove the greatest. After all, the ideal to 
which I presume all men of goodwill look forward is that not only individual nations but the 
whole world shall be ruled by law’ (PCIJ Reports 1922, Series D, No 2: 320).  
 37 Rosenne notes that ‘there was a strong drive in the preparatory phase to endow the Court 
with compulsory jurisdiction over legal disputes’; however ‘[t]he Great Powers especially were 
firmly opposed to this and the [League] Council rejected the idea: Sh. Rosenne, Permanent 
Court of International Justice, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(www.mpepil.com, para. 30). The case for compulsory jurisdiction is set out in detail in the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade in the Case concerning the Application of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. 
Russian Federation) (ICJ Reports 2011: 239, paras. 6–26).  
 38 Mazower (2013: 121) speaks of ‘Woodrow Wilson’s impatience with the entire legalist 
paradigm’. 
 39 Root to Henry Cabot Lodge, 19 June 1919, cited in Wertheim 2012: 228. See further Zasloff 
2003: 239, and 348–9): ‘Root's legalism, however, diverged sharply from Wilsonian diplomacy, 
a point obscured by frequent references to Wilson's “legalism”. As Root noted, neither the 
Versailles Treaty nor the Fourteen Points called for international legal institutions (such as a 
world court) or compulsory arbitration of legal disputes; indeed, Wilson rejected the legal-
political distinction that served as the essential framework of Root's thinking.’ 
 40 See von Bernstorff 2010: 195–6): ‘The Covenant ... enshrined the primacy of politics over 
international law institutionally within the powerful organ of the Council … [but] failed to 
institutionalize the encompassing and compulsory judicial controls of political decisions 
demanded by the [legalist] internationalists’. Giustini (1985: 213, 224) makes a similar point 
when noting that ‘The League of Nations system which followed the War did little to live up 
to these [legalist] expectations. It focused on the political rather than judicial settlement of 
disputes’. 
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way to a much more pragmatic assessment of the role of international courts and 
tribunals in world affairs. 
IV. Towards Pragmatism: International Courts and Tribunals 
on the Margins of World Politics  
By the 1920s, the main aspects of the modern system for the settlement of inter-
state disputes had been established. Arbitration had matured into a recognized 
form of dispute settlement. The international community had set up mechanisms 
for the administration of arbitral proceedings and, from 1922, possessed an 
operative, permanent world court that could respond quickly if so requested. A 
large number of bilateral and regional agreements permitted recourse to 
arbitration over particular types of disputes, while treaties concluded after World 
War 1 (beginning with the Paris peace agreements and the arrangements for 
minority protection) envisaged proceedings before the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. These were significant steps forward; and yet even by the 
1920s, a more sober perspective on courts and tribunals was gaining ground. ‘[T]he 
profound and widespread nineteenth-century faith in the peacekeeping ability of 
an international court’ (Caron 2000: 9) (still strongly felt during Hague Peace 
conference) was giving way to a pragmatic appreciation of the role of courts and 
tribunals: they were no doubt useful, but less came to be expected from them.   
A world court at last – but a modest one 
The move towards pragmatism was not brought about by a ‘one-off’, momentous 
decision; it was perhaps rather a ‘slide’ – a process in the course of which a world 
court was ‘operative’, but played a much more modest role than envisaged by 
legalists. This ‘pragmatic period’, it is argued, lasted for around five decades, from 
the 1920s to the 1970s, when the world court, in the view of contemporary 
observers, ‘ha[d] fallen to perhaps its lowest position of international prestige (Falk 
(1971: 314 –5). 
In the slide towards pragmatism, the experience of the newly established PCIJ 
was highly relevant. A world court had been established, but it hardly ever 
addressed disputes of world relevance. The move from arbitration to adjudication 
allowed for a more systematic evolution of international law, gradually moulded, as 
a by-product of litigation, in the jurisprudence of a permanent court.41 However, 
                                                          
 41 After little more than a decade of the PCIJ jurisprudence, Hersch Lauterpacht (1934) 
published a series of lectures, in monograph form, on The Development of International Law by 
the Permanent Court of International Justice. This marked the beginning of a never-ending 
stream of literature on the PCIJ’s and ICJ’s law-making potential. Writing in 2013, Ole 
Spiermann notes perceptively: ‘Obscure cases decided by the Permanent Court are household 
names, familiar to present generations of international lawyers, because they were, by 
chance, the first place for authoritative expression of various principles of general 
international law. Such statements of principle have found wide use far beyond their original 
context. As such they have little to do with the actual life of the Permanent Court, except for 
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the disputes submitted to the new world court were, if anything, of lesser 
relevance than those submitted to arbitration before World War 1. This was not 
principally a problem of jurisdiction. Even in the absence of automatic, compulsory 
jurisdiction, during the 1920s and 1930s, states regularly agreed on compromissory 
clauses establishing the jurisdiction of the PCIJ over specific types of disputes.42 
Many states went one step further and accepted the Court’s jurisdiction over all 
disputes under the so-called optional clause.43 Still, the considerable potential for 
inter-state litigation was never realized.44 States made sparing use of the Court, 
and for the bigger questions of the day they relied on other means of dispute 
settlement (or preferred not to settle). Over the two decades of its existence, the 
Court rendered a total of 32 judgments and 27 advisory opinions (i.e. less than 
three decisions per year). Its sphere of activity remained decidedly European: in 
only four cases did non-European states appear, and in only one single case did a 
non-European state (Brazil) play a decisive role.45 Its decisions, while generally well 
received, concerned a fairly limited set of issues, among them disputes about 
maritime incidents, the treatment of aliens and notably minority issues. Through its 
competent handling of these, the Court established itself – and it largely eclipsed 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration as the most prominent framework of 
international arbitration. But the PCIJ could hardly be said to intervene in matters 
of peace and war. In the words of Spiermann, ‘[i]n the political history of the 
League of Nations, the Permanent Court [was] but a footnote, partly because it did 
not address the main political issues of the day’ (Spiermann 2005: 132).  
Alternative visions of international security  
If the world court – and international arbitration – played a limited role in 
questions of war and peace, then this was partly because other international actors 
had entered the stage. As is implicit in Spiermann’s quote, the League of Nations 
was the new framework within which matters of peace and war were to be 
addressed. As the first world organization of general competence, the League 
                                                                                                                                                              
confirming the ambition on the part of the Permanent Court to take an active role in the 
development of international law, at least in the 1920s (Spiermann 2013: 399).  
42  Surveying developments, Jenks (1964: 13) perceptively notes that ‘[f]rom the Geneva 
Arbitration Act of 1872 until 1930, there appeared to be a long-term trend towards the 
acceptance of a larger measure of compulsory jurisdiction’.  The 1928 Act for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes (League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 93: 344) was the 
most ambitious attempt to expand the PCIJ’s jurisdiction; it marked the last major attempt to 
introduce compulsory arbitration or adjudication through a universal dispute settlement 
treaty, yet limited ratification numbers and far-reaching reservations affected its relevance 
(ee Caflisch 2012: 317–8). As Giustini (1985: 228) notes, ‘[n]o case was ever brought before 
the Permanent Court on the basis of the General Act’. 
 43 Under the ‘optional clause’, agreed as a substitute for proper compulsory jurisdiction during 
the drafting of the PCIJ Statute, states could voluntarily declare their willingness to accept 
the Court’s jurisdiction over all disputes; during the 1920s and 1930s, this was regularly done 
(albeit with reservations). See Tams (2013: 11, 19–21); and, for a fuller treatment, Lamm 
(2014: 12–32). 
 44 See Tams (2013: 21–8) for further comment.  
 45 Jenks (1964: 75–6) provides many details. 
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established a system of collective security, set up permanent institutions and 
gradually built networks for international co-operation.46 In the design of the inter-
War period, collective security and institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution 
(but no longer courts) were envisaged as the real alternatives to war, gradually 
coupled with normative prescriptions against military force. As is well known, that, 
too, was rather naïve. Agreed outside institutional structures, rules against war 
(such as those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact) had little traction.47 The existing 
institutional structure – the League – was meant to be a world organization, but 
never achieved universality.48 The Covenant’s collective security system was not 
designed to cope with the challenges of the 1930s.49 Throughout, the League 
depended on the support of its member states, which very often was not 
forthcoming.  
But an exclusive focus on its failures risks overlooking how much the ‘League 
experience’ shaped the international community’s approach to the prevention of 
war. After 1919, the maintenance of international peace and security had come to 
be seen as a project of collective security to be pursued within international 
organizations, with courts (unlike in the legalist project) limited to some form of 
associated role. And while concepts and strategies of collective security evolved 
over time, that basic division of roles – between an institutionalized ‘peace 
machinery’50 on the one hand, and courts and tribunals on the other – would never 
be reversed. At the universal level, during the 1940s, when designing the new 
organization for the post-WW2 order, the Allied Powers insisted that the Charter 
would recognize their primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.51 Correcting another ‘design failure’ of the League, the Charter 
banned resort to military force comprehensively.52 Of course, the UN also was to 
have its court (in fact, one more integrated into the organization53); however, any 
                                                          
 46 For instructive summaries see Claude (1971a: 42 et seq.); Dinstein (2005: 80 et seq.); for a 
contemporary perspective cf. Brierly 1932: 308). The writer’s own view is set out in Tams 
(2006: paras. 24–9). 
 47 See League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 94: 57 for the treaty text; and Dinstein 2005: 83–5 
for comment.  
 48 Tams 2006: (paras. 7–9). 
 49 Tams 2006 paras. 30–1). In the words of Claude (1971a: 46), the League’s collective security 
system (like ‘the French Maginot line’) was the product of a ‘retrospective mentality’. 
Prescribing mandatory cooling-off periods and recourse to an international body, it might 
very well have prevented states from sleepwalking into another World War 1. But the 
challenges of the 1930s were not about sleepwalking into war. ‘The League, established to 
prevent the accidental war, was unable to cope with Hitler’s deliberately plotted campaign of 
conquest’ (ibid: 46).   
 50 The term is Jessup’s: see Jessup 1960: 18). 
 51 See Claude (1971a: 60 et seq.) 
 52 According to Article 2 (4) of the Charter, ‘[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.’ This is indeed, as Schrijver notes, the ‘backbone of the Charter system of 
collective security’ (Schrijver 2014: 465, 487).  
 53 Notably, the ICJ was to be one of the UN’s principal organs (UN Charter, Article 7); the UN 
organs were authorized to seek advisory opinions (Article 96); the ICJ Statute became an 
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attempt to ‘upgrade’ its role into that of a true supreme court stood no realistic 
chance of success.54 The world court’s ‘second incarnation’, the International Court 
of Justice, was closely modelled on the Permanent Court. Its link with the UN’s 
peace and security machinery was tenuous;55 and its jurisdiction remained optional: 
states could submit disputes for judicial settlement, including in questions of peace 
and security, but they did not have to.56 All this confirms Claude’s assessment: ‘The 
United Nations has clearly contributed little to establishing the sanctity of the 
principle of judicial decision’ (Claude 1971a: 234).57 
The early years of the International Court of Justice 
Not surprisingly, during the first decades of its existence, the ICJ remained on the 
sidelines of world affairs, and had little involvement in questions of war and peace. 
The Corfu Channel case saw the Court pronounce on a British-Albanian maritime 
incident.58 Otherwise, however – and notwithstanding the willingness of UN organs 
occasionally to use the ICJ as an ‘in-house’ lawyer rendering an opinion on aspects 
of United Nations law – from Korea to Indochina to Biafra, ‘States remained 
reluctant to accept international adjudication of their conduct during wartime’ 
(Matheson 2013: 31). In fact, if anything, its role declined. Whereas most League 
members had not in principle been opposed to the idea of binding dispute 
                                                                                                                                                              
integral part of the Charter (Article 92); and compliance with judgments a Charter obligation, 
which the Security Council could help enforce (Article 94).  
 54 In fact, the Inter-Allied Committee (‘London Committee’) had recommended to keep the 
Court out of the UN’s political work (see American Journal of International Law 1945, vol. 39 
suppl.1).  
 55 While the Court is a principal organ of the UN, the Charter does not provide it with jurisdiction 
to entertain disputes. Under its Article 36, the Security Council can ‘recommend appropriate 
procedures or methods of adjustment’ and, in so doing, is meant to ‘take into consideration 
that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International 
Court of Justice’. Yet in the Court’s first contentious case, seven ICJ judges clarified that 
Article 36 of the Charter did not form a self-standing basis of jurisdiction (see Corfu Channel 
case, Separate opinion of Judges Basdevant, Alvarez, Winiarski, Zoricic, De Visscher, Badawi 
Pasha, Krylov, ICJ Reports 1948: 32).    
 56 For a survey of attempts, during the San Francisco Conference, to move towards compulsory 
jurisdiction see Cançado Trindade 2005: paras. 27–36). The UN’s only subsequent attempt to 
sponsor a general dispute settlement treaty – the Revised General Act of 1949 – ended as a 
farce. As explored in section V.1., the trend has been (in the words of O’Connell and 
VanderZee) ‘from general to specialized compulsory jurisdiction’ (2014: 58).  
 57 For a similar observation see Giustini 1985: 229: ‘The Charter does not encourage 
international adjudication. Instead, it continues the focus on political settlement.’ D.W. Greig 
goes further: ‘The Charter is perhaps more of a discouragement than an incentive to judicial 
settlement. The dispute machinery of the Charter provides a new arena for diplomatic 
exchanges and the advancement of legal arguments without fear of a final determination 
upon their validity’ (1976: 693).  
 58 This, admittedly, was a dispute involving military questions; and in retrospect, one can 
perhaps view Corfu Channel as an early example of ICJ ‘conflict litigation’ (on which more 
below, in section V.1.). But by the 1970s, it could equally be seen an isolated incident – the 
exception that proved the rule. And of course, like subsequent instances of conflict litigation, 
Corfu Channel raised serious compliance problems; it took around 45 years for Albania to 
honour the award. 
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settlement, Communist states were.59 Newly-independent states emerging since 
the late 1950s viewed the world court with indifference or suspicion; after the 
1966 South West Africa judgment, in which the Court on dubious grounds refused 
to entertain Ethiopia’s and Liberia’s legal challenge of South Africa’s imposition of 
apartheid policies, many became openly hostile.60  
Assessments of the ICJ’s record during the first 25–30 years of its existence 
reflect a growing sense of pessimism, if not despair: Inis L. Claude criticized the 
‘Politics of neglect’ (1971b: 344), which led states to withhold cases from the Court; 
an influential study published in 1976 bore the title ‘The International Court of 
Justice: An Analysis of a Failure’ (King Gamble and Fischer 1976). Not everyone 
agreed with that overall verdict, yet even benevolent observers recognized that in 
relation to the questions of peace and security, the ICJ was not a relevant factor: 
‘At present the Court has very little to do with the enforcement of peace’, states 
Lissitzyn (1951: 103) in an influential study prepared for the Carnegie Endowment. 
(In fact, during the mid-1970s, the Court had nothing to do at all, as states had 
stopped referring disputes to it.) In Max Sørensen’s assessment, the Court’s role in 
world affairs was ‘relatively insignificant’ (Sørensen 1960: 261, 272); while Hersch 
Lauterpacht (perhaps the 20th century’s most influential advocate of international 
courts) thought it ‘an exaggeration to assert that the Court has proved to be a 
significant instrument for maintaining international peace’ (1958: 4). And according 
to a detailed German study published in the 1970s, the idea of ‘arbitration instead 
of war’ had gone ‘completely belly-up’ (von Mangoldt 1974: 83).  
These verdicts by contemporaries are perhaps too damning. With the benefit of 
hindsight, when looking at international arbitration and adjudication from a slightly 
broader perspective, one can make out signs of a reorientation. Though not 
‘enforcing peace’ (or stopping wars), courts and tribunals even in the ‘pragmatic 
phase’ were mandated to address discrete legal issues relating to military conflicts. 
Two of these discrete functions deserve to be mentioned, as they were to provide 
blueprints for subsequent, more ambitious, initiatives. First, drawing on 19th 
century practice, arbitral tribunals were set up to hear claims by individuals for war-
time losses (see Matheson 2013: 19–21; Neff 2014: 357–8). In the aftermath of 
World War 1, this method was prevalent in dealing with a particular set of 
consequences of the war; but after 1945, the practice seemed to fall out of favour: 
questions of reparation were largely dealt with through treaty arrangements 
(Matheson 2013: 24–5). Second, the international community had begun to rely on 
                                                          
 59 See Giustini 1985: 243: ‘In general, the influence of the Soviet bloc has been strongly against 
the extension of the judicial function in international relations’. 
 60 In 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia, the only two African states that had been members of the 
League of Nations, instituted ICJ proceedings, alleging that South Africa had not fulfilled its 
duties under the South West Africa mandate granted to it by the League of Nations. After 
having initially upheld jurisdiction, the ICJ in 1966 dismissed the case, holding – with the 
narrowest of margins – that Ethiopia and Liberia had no standing to enforce the mandate 
provisions (see ICJ Reports 1966: 6). As Falk (1971) explains, the 1966 decision ran counter to 
the general view within the United Nations that South Africa was internationally accountable 
for its conduct in South West Africa: ‘For the ICJ to cast a shadow across this consensus, after 
so many years of pleadings and arguments, was to outrage the diplomats of black Africa, to 
disappoint almost every government in the world, and to give international adjudication an 
image, at once, hopelessly reactionary and cumbersome’ (Falk 1971: 318). 
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courts as instruments of international criminal justice. After cautious initiatives 
after World War 1, the tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo marked the first 
concerted attempts to hold individuals criminally accountable for their conduct 
during wartime.61 This was a much more visible (and much more controversial) form 
of adjudication about military conflicts, which served a range of functions, from 
punishment to the recording of history. By the 1960s and 1970s, attempts to 
consolidate the post-WW2 acquis of international criminal justice62 had clearly lost 
momentum; still, the examples of Nuremberg and Tokyo suggested that courts 
could perhaps adapt to perform new roles relating to war and peace. 
New crises, old medicines: Hans Kelsen’s Peace through Law 
However, outside these discrete functions, relatively little remained of the 
ambitious legalist plans for world peace. The movement itself faded away relatively 
quickly.63 Arbitration and adjudication remained relevant topics to international 
lawyers, but after the 1920s quickly ceased to be matters of general interest. 
Internationalist sentiment did not disappear, but embraced other causes, from the 
League in the 1920s (when national ‘League associations’ attracted large numbers 
of members64) to nuclear disarmament, self-determination and perhaps human 
rights after 1945. Ironically, the limited appeal of the legalist movement during the 
pragmatic era can be seen from the response to one of its most ambitious 
proposals, viz. Hans Kelsen’s Peace Through Law project (Kelsen 1944).65 Published 
in 1944, at the height of debates about the post-WW2 order, this was a new 
attempt to prescribe an old medicine:66 Kelsen proposed founding a new world 
organization built around a ‘proper’ world court, which would have jurisdiction over 
disputes relating to war and peace. To him, the decision to establish the world 
court on the margins of the League’s ‘peace machinery’ (Jessup 1960)67 was a 
fundamental mistake; like earlier generations of legalists, Kelsen felt that progress 
                                                          
 61 Neff (2014: 397-400) provides an instructive summary; Robert Cryer traces the impact of the 
trials of Leipzig, Nuremberg and Tokyo (2005: 31–48). For many details on the German 
position see Kress 2006: 15.  
 62 See notably UN General Assembly Resolution 95 (I) (1946); International Law Commission, 
Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the 
Judgment of the Tribunal, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1950, vol. II: 374.   
 63 In Mazower’s words, the legalist ‘movement['s] ... success in the years before [World War 1] 
was matched only by the marginalization that greeted it in the decades after it’ (2013: 83–4).  
 64 To give just one example, membership in the British League of Nations Union stood at circa 
400,000 in 1931; in the words of a recent study, ‘the League inspired a rich and participatory 
culture of political protest, popular education and civic ritual, which took root in British 
society between the wars’ (McCarthy 2011: x). 
 65 For a clear analysis see von Bernstorff 2010: 193 et seq. 
 66 As Jochen von Bernstorff (2010: 193) notes, Kelsen was essentially ‘reviving the Hague 
Movement’s strategy of juridifying international relations through obligatory arbitration’. 
 67 In the words of Kelsen: ‘One of the most important, if not the decisive, causes [for the 
League’s failure] is a fatal fault of its construction, the fact that the authors of the Covenant 
placed at the center of this international organization not the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, but a kind of international administration, the Council of the League of 
Nations’ (1942: 151–2). 
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towards the ‘pacification of the world’ had to be brought about by courts and 
tribunals with compulsory jurisdiction.68 But what had seemed prophetic a few 
decades earlier now failed to resonate: academic response among international 
lawyers was at best lukewarm;69 and at San Francisco, the drafters of the Charter 
much preferred other methods of pacifying international relations. To them, as to 
one of Kelsen’s reviewers, it simply seemed ‘an illusion to believe that it ever will 
be possible to transform world history into nothing but a court procedure’ (Kunz 
1944: 673, 678). As a consequence, ‘progress on the way to the pacification of the 
world’ (cf. Kelsen 1942: 152) (which according to Kelsen required compulsory 
adjudication) could be sought through a range of different methods. 
V.  Revitalization and Reorientation: the New Popularity of 
International Courts and Tribunals 
Even if Kelsen’s desire for a general world court of compulsory jurisdiction in 
order to achieve the ‘pacification of the world’ remains unsatisfied it is clear that 
some seventy years after the San Francisco Conference international courts are 
pursuing new, and different, horizons. As noted in the introduction, dozens of new 
courts and tribunals have been established and risen in prominence and relevance; 
they occupy ‘new terrains’70 well beyond the expectations that would have seemed 
‘realistic’ (cf. Falk 1971) to observers writing in the 1960s or 1970s. WTO dispute 
settlement organs assess the legality of the EU's anti-GMO policies; the European 
Court of Human Rights scrutinizes British conduct during the occupation of Iraq; an 
ICSID tribunal hears arguments on Germany's nuclear phase-out; while the 
Philippines pursues arbitral proceedings against China over maritime rights in the 
South China Sea. If numbers, and public interest, are relevant indicators, this indeed 
seems to be an ‘age of adjudication’.71 Yet from even the most eclectic of listings, it 
is clear that adjudication has not just been revitalized, but also adapted to meet 
new goals. The subsequent section traces the parallel trends of revitalization and 
reorientation, but also highlights how, in crucial respects, things have not really 
changed that much. 
The most obvious development in dispute resolution over the past half-century is 
the ‘enormous growth of fora’ (Romano 2008: 435) involved in binding dispute 
resolution. The growth had begun towards the end of the ‘pragmatic phase’, and it 
has picked up speed since 1989: at that point, there were six standing judicial 
bodies; to which nearly twenty courts and arbitral frameworks have been added 
                                                          
 68 Kelsen was emphatic on this point: ‘As long as it is not possible to remove from the interested 
states the prerogative to answer this question [whether international law has been violated] 
and transfer it once and for all to an impartial authority, namely, an international court, any 
further progress on the way to the pacification of the world is absolutely excluded’ (1944: 13–
14).   
 69 For a survey see von Schmädel 2011: 71. For a much more positive assessment of Kelsen’s 
approach (and impact) see O’Connell and VanderZee 2014: 56–8).  
 70 Cf. the title of Karen Alter’s influential study of 2014 (Alter 2014b). 
 71 Cf. Christopher Greenwood, at http://legal.un.org/avl/ls/Greenwood_CT.html. 
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since. As developments have been analysed elsewhere in detail,72 it may be 
convenient to focus on the main trends, which for reasons of convenience can be 
summarized under three headings:  
The establishment of specialized courts and tribunals 
The first trend has been one of functional specialization. Whereas debates during 
the first half of the 20th century focused on courts with potentially unlimited, 
general jurisdiction, the new courts tend to be specialized. Whereas the PCIJ and 
ICJ, just like arbitral tribunals established under the Hague system, could 
potentially address disputes covering international law in its entirety, more recent 
courts and tribunals have been established as guardians of particular treaty 
regimes (Shany 2009: 80). This has made the landscape of international dispute 
settlement more diverse; systems of international adjudication and arbitration 
today are tailor-made to meet the demands of specialized sub-systems. It has also 
resulted in a very uneven degree of ‘judicialization’. The ‘growth of fora’ (Romano 
2008: 435) is ‘sector-specific’ and has mainly concerned three distinct fields: human 
rights law, international economic law, and international criminal law. As in all 
moves towards specialization, courts and tribunals established in these fields come 
with the promise of increased expertise, which needs to be balanced against the 
risks of silo thinking.  
The move towards regionalism  
Similarly, there has been a move from global towards regional dispute settlement 
bodies (Alter 2014a: 65). With the exception of the Central American Court (Supra, 
III.1.), the early courts were set up as universal institutions (even though the 
practical impact of this may have been limited in a global legal order dominated by 
European states). Since 1945, the move towards a truly universal legal order has 
been matched (and to some extent balanced) by a return to regional law-making, 
which has also led to the establishment of regional courts. As with specialization, 
this has permitted groups of states to advance where universal solutions lacked 
general support; at the same time, it has accentuated differences between more 
and less judicialized areas of international law: in terms of numbers, Europe clearly 
leads the move towards courts and tribunals, with Africa and the Americas 
following, and Asia lagging behind.73  
The rise of non-state actors 
Finally, within the more diversified landscape of international dispute settlement, 
non-state actors have risen to prominence (Romano 2008: 437–8). Until 1945, 
permanent institutions for international adjudication and arbitration were typically 
                                                          
 72 The following notably draws on Alter 2014b; Alter 2014a: 63; Romano 2008; Kingsbury 2012; 
and Shany 2009: 73.  
 73 C.P.R. Romano speaks of ‘uneven geographical distribution’ (2014: 90–1). 
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reserved to states.74 Since then, and increasingly, binding dispute resolution has 
opened up and become more inclusive. Individuals are the natural claimants before 
human rights courts. Investment arbitration is driven by corporations. And since 
Nuremburg, the fact that ‘[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, 
not by abstract entities’75 has been an article of faith for proponents of 
international criminal justice, which is justice imposed on individuals. 
A paradigm change? 
These developments have clearly strengthened the role of international courts 
and tribunals in international relations, to the point where commentators speak of 
a ‘paradigm change’ (Alter 2014b: 3) or (more ambivalently) of a ‘new tribunalism’ 
(Skouteris 2006: 307). This shift ostensibly concerns the relevance of international 
adjudication and arbitration, which according to most intuitive parameters – 
numbers of decision, their impact on state governance, newspaper coverage, and 
academic interest – has greatly increased. Beyond that, it also affects the roles 
played by them. International courts and tribunals still tend to become active once 
a dispute has been submitted to them. However, their impact on international 
relations seems to have shifted. In the words of Yuval Shany, ‘despite their 
frequent engagement in dispute settlement activities, the new courts are no 
longer primarily dispute-settling bodies ... They appear to have assumed two other 
primary functions instead: norm-advancement and regime maintenance’, which may 
involve ‘promoting a set of values such as human rights, or an end to impunity for 
international criminals’, but also ‘strengthening the rule of law in some areas of 
international relations which have undergone, or are undergoing, a process of 
legalization’ (Shany 2009: 81–3). In the process, courts to some degree have lost 
their innocence and become highly controversial – witness current European 
debates about investment arbitration and the African Union’s concerns about the 
ICC as a political tool of Western states. At the same time, they have assumed fairly 
mundane functions such as controlling the interpretation and application of 
international rules within areas of regional economic integration.  
Given all these fundamental changes, it is worth noting that in the particular area 
under review in the present contribution, developments have been less dramatic. 
While the international community today ‘deploys’ courts and tribunals to perform 
a wide array of governance functions, the prevention of military conflict is usually 
not one of them.76 Put differently, the revitalization of international courts and 
tribunals is not a return to the ‘idealistic approach’ of old that had viewed 
arbitration and adjudication as alternatives to war. Even in the ‘era of adjudication’, 
                                                          
 74 While the inter-state paradigm dominated, there were exceptions: the Central American 
Court of Justice was open to individuals, as would have been the International Prize Court. 
And claims commissions and tribunals were mixed from the beginning. 
 75 International Military Tribunal, Judgment and Sentences, in American Journal of International 
Law 41 (1947: 223). 
 76 As Kingsbury notes, ‘[t]he issues being adjudicated … are largely those of a global legal order 
dominated by liberal interests’ (Kingsbury 2012: 211). To illustrate, trade law issues can today 
be litigated, foreign intervention in civil wars only exceptionally; investors frequently have 
access to international tribunals, refugees tend not to.  
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courts and tribunals typically deal with discrete aspects of military conflicts: more 
often than before, no doubt, but not systematically or at the forefront of 
international endeavours at conflict resolution.  
The increasing relevance of international courts  
The pursuit of international criminal justice is the most visible of these discrete 
aspects. Since the 1990s, the international community has built on the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo precedents and established a network of international and hybrid 
criminal tribunals competent to hold individuals accountable for atrocities usually 
committed during military conflict.77 What has equally been revived is the tradition 
of claims procedures set up in the aftermath of conflicts and crises.78 
In addition to these established contributions, international courts and tribunals 
today address aspects of military conflicts from two novel angles. The first has to 
do with the rise of human rights law. Over the past decades, regional courts have 
begun to apply human rights to conflict situations, and to hold states to account 
over their conduct.79 In so doing, they have overcome archaic divisions between the 
legal regimes for peace and wartime. Yet the practical challenge of identifying the 
precise reach of individual rights guarantees in crisis situations remains enormous 
(See Lubell 2005: 737). 
The second new trend is perhaps more remarkable. Since the 1980s, states have 
gradually become aware of the potential of submitting aspects of military conflicts 
to international courts and tribunals. States as diverse as Nicaragua, Bosnia, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Georgia 
have sought judicial decisions against states involved, directly or indirectly, in 
military conflicts with them.80 Such forms of ‘conflict litigation’ face enormous 
obstacles. Due to jurisdictional limits, international courts are hardly ever capable 
of addressing a conflict in its entirety;81 typically they can only deal with a side-
aspect of it (or eventually conclude that they lack jurisdiction).82 What is more, 
                                                          
 77 Alter (2014a: 66–7) lists three properly international criminal tribunals (ICTY, ICTR, ICC) and a 
range of hybrid equivalents. Romano (2008: 438–40) provides an instructive summary. It is 
worth noting that the jurisdiction of international criminal courts does not necessarily depend 
on whether crimes have been committed during armed conflict; but in practice, some nexus 
will typically exist.  
 78 See Matheson 2013: 87–90 (with brief comment on the two most prominent examples, the 
UN Compensation Commission established after the 1991 Gulf War and the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Claims Commission).  
 79 See Oberleitner (2015) for a comprehensive account.  
 80 The clearest survey – covering both contentious cases and advisory opinions requested on 
aspects of military conflicts (notably the Israeli wall/security fence) – can be found in 
Matheson 2013: 33–62; also instructive is Crook 2014: 330.  
 81 To illustrate, in addressing the claims by Bosnia and Croatia against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, the ICJ could only pronounce on questions of genocide (see Matheson 2013: 42–
4). 
 82 This e.g. happened in the cases brought by Georgia against Russia (relating to the July war of 
2008), by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against ten NATO member states (during the 
Kosovo campaign of 1999), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo against Rwanda 
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proceedings can last for years and test the faith of states in courts.83 Because of 
these obstacles, international litigation is typically pursued alongside other 
methods of conflict resolution. Unlike in the legalist vision of a century ago, it is not 
an alternative to war, but one of many strategies employed by the claimant to 
minimize the negative consequences of conflicts.84  
Where do we stand?  The status quo  
The combined effect of these trends is that international courts and tribunals 
today engage with aspects of military conflicts almost on a regular basis.85 Yet they 
(continue to) do so from very particular angles: they have become fora for (often 
retrospective) debates about matters of war and peace, tools for mobilizing public 
opinion and recorders of history; they impose sanctions, enforce individual claims 
and occasionally rule on the legality of forcible state conduct. The prevention of 
wars is still largely outside their remit: the judicial role in crisis management 
remains ‘an auxiliary or supporting role’ (Rosenne 2002: 195, 217). 
 
Judging from public debates, this is unlikely to change any time soon. Just as 
international courts have become specialized, so has the debate about them. 
Courts are appreciated and evaluated as integral parts of sectoral regimes. And 
whilst it is certainly the case that controversies surround the particularities of 
world trade panels, human rights courts, or investment tribunals, there is no 
attempt to return to the times of general courts: the debate has moved ‘from 
general to specific compulsory jurisdiction’ (O’Connell and VanderZee 2014: 58). As 
regards military conflicts, international criminal justice has become the favoured 
project of contemporary internationalists; this seems today’s equivalent to the late 
19th century’s fascination with inter-state arbitration, or the post-WW2 focus on 
                                                                                                                                                              
(concerning the respondent’s involvement in the second Congo war) (see Matheson (2013: 
44–5, 50–3 and 58–9). 
 83 For example, when warned about Nicaragua’s institution of proceedings, the United States 
first amended and then revoked its optional clause declaration; while this did not prevent the 
ICJ from pronouncing on Nicaragua’s claims, the United States has since remained a more 
cautious ICJ participant; it also withdrew from the Nicaragua proceedings and refused to 
honour the ICJ’s damages award. When the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sued ten NATO 
member states during the 1999 Kosovo campaign, and amongst other claims relied on the 
Genocide Convention, this was decried as an abuse of process. By the same token, Israel (and 
a number of other states) were highly critical of the decision to request an ICJ advisory 
opinion on legal issues relating to the Israeli wall/security fence. For much more on these and 
similar challenges see Crook 2014; and Gray 2003: 867. 
 84 Gray (2013: 904) succinctly summarizes the divergent perceptions on conflict litigation: ‘The 
large increase in the number of cases on the use of force taken to the ICJ in recent years can 
be interpreted in a variety of ways. Taken most favourably, it shows the willingness of states 
to use the Court to reaffirm their conviction in the legality of their position in a conflict 
against a stronger opponent. Seen less favourably, such cases are an unhelpful move in a 
propaganda war where settlement is already being pursued through other means; weak cases 
may be brought as a means of distracting, delaying or inconveniencing an opponent’.  
 85 As Matheson (2013: 61) notes, ‘[t]he involvement of international civil tribunals in situations 
of armed conflict over the past two decades stands in sharp contrast with what came before’.  
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disarmament. Calls to vest the world court with general compulsory jurisdiction 
over inter-state disputes can still be heard with some frequency,86 but they lack the 
determination (or stubbornness?) of Kelsen’s Peace Through Law and the passion of 
the legalists’ appeal. Writing in 1996, the former ICJ President Sir Robert Jennings 
– by no means a cynic – offered the following cautious assessment: ‘International 
lawyers have been calling, but calling in vain, for general compulsory jurisdiction for 
an international court since at least 1899 at the First Hague Peace Conference. It 
now seems as far off as ever. Surely the time has come to look harder for the 
reasons why governments do not feel able to respond to the call’ (Jennings 1997: 
1, 56). 
VI. Concluding Thoughts 
It is beyond doubt that international adjudication occupies an established place in 
world affairs. Important areas of international relations have been effectively 
judicialized, in ways and degrees that the legalist movement of the pre-WW1 era 
could hardly have predicted. Yet in rising to prominence and relevance, 
international adjudication has largely been decoupled from war prevention, its 
original purpose. Its contributions to peace are manifold, but indirect. 200 years 
after Bentham's Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace, few would accept that if 
only a court were established, ‘the necessity of war no longer follows from 
differences of opinion’ (Bentham 1843: 552). International courts do not – and are 
no longer expected to – provide ‘heroic and life-saving emergency treatment’; 
instead they have become ‘providers of preventive health care and quality-of-life 
treatment’ (Shany 2009: 80). As part of their more diverse mandates, international 
courts and tribunals do engage with aspects of military conflicts, but they do not 
exist today to prevent wars. 
 
This can be decried as a lack of ambition and vision, or even as a betrayal of 
ancient ideals.87 But perhaps the better view is to understand the evolving roles of 
international courts and tribunals as part of a more profound change in the history 
of 20th century international relations, namely the move towards more 
comprehensive international organization. As has been shown, the advent of the 
League, and certainly that of the UN, has fundamentally affected the role of courts 
                                                          
 86 For recent proposals see e.g. Steiger (1996: 817); and Cançado Trindade (2005: 515). Within 
the United Nations, proposals tend to focus on the optional clause, which states are regularly 
encouraged to accept: see e.g. Boutros-Ghali (1992), An Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. A/47/277 
para. 38; K. Annan (2006), Statement at the Sixtieth Anniversary Celebration of the 
International Court of Justice, UN Doc No. SG/SM/10414. But beyond the encouragement, no 
real pressure is exerted; and new declarations inevitably come with significant reservations. 
 87 In this direction: Cançado Trindade (2011: para. 83), citing his concurring opinion in the case of 
Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: "If we are 
really prepared to extract the lessons of the evolution of international law in a turbulent 
world throughout the twentieth century, (...) we cannot abide by an international practice 
which has been subservient to state voluntarism [and] which has betrayed the spirit and 
purpose of the optional clause of compulsory jurisdiction". 
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in ‘peace through law’ designs: alongside the comprehensive world organizations 
mandated to preserve peace and security, they no longer seemed natural dispute 
settlers. Adapting Stephen Neff’s statement quoted at the beginning of this 
contribution,88 while preferable to the ‘political cut and thrust’ of old, dispute 
settlement in the ‘hushed calm of courtrooms’ does not necessarily appear superior 
to collective decision-making by organs of the organized international community. 
From 1919 onwards, arbitration and adjudication have no longer been the most 
obvious, let alone the only alternatives to war: and so, they have come to occupy 
niches in a broader scheme that primarily sought to attain world peace through 
world organization – a ‘noble forward stride’ of a different kind. This – rather than a 
betrayal of ideas – may explain the gradual move away from legalist visions over 
the course of the 20th century.  
 
 
  
                                                          
 88 ‘If all disputes could be resolved in the hushed calm of courtrooms rather than the swirling 
world of political cut-and-thrust, then civilization could be said to have taken a giant and 
noble forward stride’ (Neff 2014: 346). 
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